The Ethical Dimension of Non-State Armed Groups (Part I)

Please note that this entry is part of an extended essay written by the author during his internship with the South-South Network on Non-State Armed Group Engagement (SSN). Nevertheless, the opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarliy reflect the view of the SSN.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

MILF insurgents in Mindanao, Philippines. Image: Keith Bacongco

Combining my academic background (philosophy/ethics) with my area of work and interest (security issues), I will explore a topic that has not yet attracted much attention by scholars, researchers or the public. While there are considerable research efforts in the field of military ethics (take for example the quarterly Journal of Military Ethics) that is concerned with ethical considerations of national armed forces, the ethical and moral dimension of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG, also known as Violent Non-State Actor, VNSA) is characterized by a severe shortage in research. This is not surprising, considering that the majority of researchers in this field are based in and come from western countries that are not or only marginally affected by NSAGs but who’s armies are involved in conflicts abroad that often raise ethical concerns. Examples for very popular discussions in the field of military ethics revolve around the use of UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles, commonly referred to as “drones”) for “targeted killing” or the torture of enemy combatants and the denial to concede the status “Prisoners of War” to them. This entry is sort of an introduction where I will explain why research and discussion of these issues matters and describe the current state of research. In the next entry I will discuss if NSAGs bear social or moral responsibility. Part III will finally identify particular ethical dimensions that are unique to or especially applicable for NSAGs.

Why does it matter?

Bombed out vehicles in Aleppo, Syria

The United Nations stopped counting the death toll of the Syrian Civil War, but estimates speak of 140.000 victims since the beginning of the Syrian Revolution in 2011. The full extent of the destruction, however, cannot be captured with these figures. Both the Syrian Armed Forces and the rebels have committed terrible warcrimes. The Syrian economy and society are  permanently damaged and will need many years of recovery after the fighting stops.

The Syrian example is only one of many, and it is a preview of the future of warfare. While the 20th century has already seen many conflicts involving extralegal military groupings, this is and will continue to be the prevalent phenomenon of the 21st century. In his book Wars, Guns, and Votes, Paul Collier, professor of economics at Oxford University and author of the famous The Bottom Billion, states that “[t]he wars that will fill our television screens this century will be civil wars, not international wars” (p. 121). His prediction is backed by the data presented in the Conflict Barometer 2012, a publication of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). It holds that, “as in previous years, about 80 percent of all conflicts were domestic” and adds that “[t]he average intensity calculated for all domestic conflicts observed (2.63) was approx. one intensity level higher than that of interstate conflicts (1.57)" (p. 3-4; The brand new Conflict Barometer 2013 will be available on their website later today). NSAGs are by their nature participants in civil wars and other intrastate violent conflicts, in which they fight on at least one side. Following the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement’s working definition, in this paper the term NSAG refers “to rebel or insurgent groups, i.e. groups that are armed, use force to achieve their political/quasi-political objectives, and are autonomous from the state. As used here, NSAGs do not refer to state-controlled militias or paramilitaries, civil defense units, mercenaries, private military and security companies, proxy armed forces and the like.”

Iraqi insurgents from northern Iraq. Image: Menendj

Although NSAGs are by no means a new phenomenon, it was only after the end of Cold War that they became an increasingly important subject of research and international debate. Jörn Grävingholt et al. of the German Development Institute explain the increased degree of attention by referring to the concept of “human security”, which, after the dissolution of ideological bipolarity, became “a new guiding concept of international efforts to ensure peace and prevent violence”. By adopting this policy, the focus shifted to “those whose actions are primarily responsible for guaranteeing – or endangering – human security” (p. 18). This view is also hold by Troy S. Thomas, member of the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, et al., who call the violent non-state actor “today’s most ubiquitous adversary” and claim that such groups “play a prominent, often destabilizing role in nearly every humanitarian and political crisis faced by the international community" (p. 2). With NSAGs being key players in the future of warfare, further attention for ethical implications is necessary in this area by academics, professional researchers and the public.

The focus on the ethical dimension of NSAGs is especially important with a view to the enormous impact that civil wars have on affected and neighboring societies. A working paper by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue asserts that NSAGs play a critical role “as they address key issues of human security, including the illicit trade in small arms, the recruitment of child soldiers and the use of landmines” (p. 13).

Soldier near a refugee camp in the Central African Republic

The misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) by NSAGs includes the killing and injuring of combatants and civilians during the period of active warfare and often results in the mass flight of the local population. In their paper Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting Stops, Hazem A. Ghobarah et al. found proof that, with the collapse of the public health system, “civil wars greatly raise the subsequent risk of death and disability from many infectious diseases, including malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious respiratory diseases.” The paper also argues that “civil wars increase the risk of death and disability through the breakdown of norms and practices of social order” (p. 30-31), a finding that is highly interesting in respect to the ethical dimension of NSAGs.

Finally, civil wars have tremendous consequences on the economy of affected societies. In Wars, Guns, and Votes, Paul Collier estimates that the economic costs of a typical civil war in a society of the bottom billion “are the equivalent to losing around two years of income, or some $20 billion." (p. 137; In his book The Bottom Billion, Collier identifies four development traps. Low income countries that are caught in at least one of these traps are defined as bottom billion countries.)

Many of the above mentioned impacts and consequences of civil war have two things in common: They are (1) highly persistent and will affect societies long after the civil war has ended and they also have (2) very negative effects on neighboring countries. For example, the neighbor states of countries that are affected by civil war suffer from raising HIV/AIDS rates as well as increases in the number of homicides. Furthermore, civil wars caused tremendous damage to neighboring economies.

The current state of research

When it comes to the ethical dimension of NSAGs, most of the research that is been conducted focusses on the closely related area of legal issues. Some scholars look into the field of international criminal law and how it could be extended to NSAGs. Another area of discussion is the Human Rights obligation of NSAGs in general as well as in violent conflicts in particular. Apart from Human Rights, many researchers focus on the compliance of NSAGs with International Humanitarian Law, the law of armed conflict. These legal questions are topped off by the discussion how and if NSAGs are punishable. Apart from legal issues, some publications deal with the moral misconduct committed by NSAGs, for example the use of landmines or the employment of child soldiers.

So much about the importance and state of research. In my next entry I will focus on the uncharted territory on the map of ethics and NSAGs.

Does Negotiating With Terrorists Encourage More Terrorism?

"Negotiating with terrorists encourages even more terrorism" is a claim often heard in the political arena. But should we believe politicians who try us make to believe that fire can only be fought by fire, that the only answer to violence is more violence?

Harmonie Toros from the University of Kent published a paper about engaging with terrorism. According to her, a “key objection raised by terrorism scholars and policymakers against engaging in negotiations with terrorists is that it legitimizes terrorist groups, their goals and their means. Talking to them would serve only to incite more violence and weaken the fabric of democratic states, they argue.” In fact, many politicians advocate a policy of not negotiating with terrorists. This often has its roots in the belief that terrorists are not actually willing to accept compromise, a notion that undeniably applies to numerous terrorist groups, namely the ones with maximalist demands, e.g. ideological demands over beliefs or values.

George W. Bush & Valdimir Putin. Picture: White House

In 2002, US President George W. Bush explained his position that “[n]o nation can negotiate with terrorists, for there is no way to make peace with those whose only goal is death.” While this exposes a rather one-dimensional understanding of terrorism, Mr. Bush is certainly not alone is his argumentation. Vladimir Putin, at that time president of the Russian Federation, stated in 2004 that “[t]he universally recognized method of fighting terrorism is denying any negotiations with terrorists because any contact with them encourages committing new, bloodier crimes.” What I am trying to find out is if the claim by these two (former) political leaders and decision-makers and many others, for example 60 percent of the respondends in a survey in the United States, is justified or not. But before we go into detail, we have to answer the question why it actually matters if they are right or wrong.

If it is true that negotiations with terrorists encourage them to commit even more attacks, diplomacy would be a poor strategy for policymakers. As terrorism studies are ultimately aimed at finding ways to respond to and counter terrorism, scholars and dedicated citicens (like you) would have to discourage politicians from engaging in negotiations with terrorists. This would have a major impact on ongoing negotiations and peace processes. It is, therefore, important to test the assumption to give fact-based advice to policymakers and to effectively support their fight against violence.

One argument against the claim that negotiating with terrorists encourages more terrorism is that, in fact, many governments do (openly or secretly) negotiate with organizations they label “terrorist”. This holds even for governments that publicly pronounce against such actions. According to Peter R. Neumann from London's King's College, “[w]hen it comes to negotiating with terrorists, there is a clear disconnect between what governments profess and what they actually do.” For him it is not the question if, but how to engage in negotiations with terrorists “in a way that minimizes the risk of setting dangerous precedents and destabilizing its political system.” If governments find the right strategy to engage in negotiations with terrorists, they have a chance to end terrorism or at least reduce violence; the British government’s negotiations with the IRA are a successful example.

In a TEDx Talk at the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Mitchell Reiss from the US State Department warns that not negotiating might mean to miss an opportunity to end the
killing and violence but also points out the long and difficult road to successful negotiations. Another

Gilad Shalit arriving at IDF airbase. Picture: IDF

scholar, Grant Wardlaw, says in his book Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures (Cambridge (2)1989) about the US governments refusal to negotiate with terrorists: “This extreme
determination to adopt the hardline approach is only likely to reduce their options” (p. 73). A further argument for negotiations is the case of kidnapping or prisoner exchange. Even governments with rather strict policies towards terrorists agree at least sometimes to negotiate terms for a release of hostages to safe the lifes of their citizens. The prisoner exchange between Israel and the Hamas that freed IDF soldier Gilad Shalit is a famous example. It was widly and controversially disussed in the Israeli public. Some complained that the price was too high, others argued that terrorists should not be released at all and yet others were worried that negotiating with terrorists about hostage-release and the exchange of prisoners might incentivice further terrorist attacks. This claim would impicate that we should consider the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit and possible similar future events as acts of terrorism. This is problematic in many ways. Firstly, the status of the Hamas as a terrorist organization is internationally disputed. Furthermore, it is, after all, a democratically elected government. A discussion of the issue of state-terrorism would lead too far from our topic though. Secondly, in my opinion only one of the three requirements of my understanding of the term terrorism applies, namely the use of physical violence. I find the evidence for an attempt to spread fear not very compelling, especially since the Hamas demanded a ransom. I would, therefore, say that kidnapping-for-ransom does not constitute terrorism, particularly in cases in which the hostages are released. As a consequence, negotiations with terrorist groups about hostage release do not encourage more terrorism. The question if or if not they encourage kidnapping is a different one. At least in the case of Israel and the Hamas there haven't been any further incidences.

An argument that speaks for the claim that negotiating with terrorists encourages more terrorism is historical: Even though Nazi Germany was not a terror organization per definition, it can still serve as

British Prime Minister Chamberlain announcing "Peace in our Time”

an example on how negotiations (the conference in 1938 that led to the Munich Agreement) with a violent actor holding maximalist demands went terribly wrong. Furthermore, negotiating with terrorists gives them a feeling of legitimization that policymakers try to avoid. Another argument is that making compromises with terrorist organizations would encourage others to form terrorist groups and committ acts of terrorism, too. This would imply that (1) there are numerous individuals within a given society that are willing to commit crimes, die or become imprisoned in order to achieve their goals and that (2) there is a variety of limited objectives that individuals find worthy becoming terrorists for (even if it means their death) if there is a slight chance of achieving them. I personally disagree with this rational-choice-theory approach to individual decision-making, even though I have to admit that it is difficult to find proof for or against it in this particular case. It strongly depends on the kind of society in which the terrorist organization acts and recruits its members. In countries with a high degree of human development and easy access to information it will be more difficult to convince individuals that achieving a certain goal is worth accepting the very negative consequences of being member of a terrorist organization, while this might not always hold for developing countries.

Terrorism is oftentimes rooted in a major grievance that - at least sometimes - has to do with the way a government governs - or miscoverns. If the policymakers of a country don't want to negotiate with terrorists, they should at least consider weaker forms of engagement as it might help them to understand the grievance and find ways to tackle it. In the ideal (but admittedly rare) case, this could make a terrorist organization obsolete by destroying its basis.

Negotiating with terrorists might have negative consequences, but I strongly believe that there are cases in which the benefits outweigh the costs. It is always important to ask if an engagement can be fruitful, especially when dealing with groups holding maximalist demands. On the one hand it is easy to see how negotiations with for example a terrorist group promoting international jihad would be absolutely futile. This is because many groups holding maximalist demands do not even seek negotiations as they do not believe that a government would accept their conditions. Moreover, their objectives are completely opposed to the values of many societies and, therefore, disqualified as a basis of negotiatons. On the other hand there are cases in which negotiations might be a very helpful way to end political violence. Terrorist groups with limited demands like for example over territory are more likely to enter into negotiations and to actually agree to a compromise.

I believe that we cannot generalze on this issue. The assumption that negotiating with terrorists encourages even more terrorism is not completely wrong but also only partly true, depending on the type of group, e.g. if it holds limited or maximalist objectives, and the way the government is approaching negotiations. Negotiations with terrorist groups should, therefore, always be regarded as a tool of policymakers.

Germany's New Role

German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen
Source: CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion.

When former German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle was voted out of office in last year’s elections, his policy of military restraint left with him. The newly appointed Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen recently determined Germany’s new orientation. When asked about Germany’s new role in countries like the Central African Republic, she stated: “We can't look away when murder and rape are taking place daily.” And she is not alone. Westerwelle’s successor in the Foreign Office, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, explained Germany’s new role in Africa to the press: “Europe can't leave France on its own.” This weekend, Germany’s President Joachim Gauck held a speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he expressed his opinion that “Germany should make a more substantial contribution [to conflict prevention], and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.”

German’s allies have long been demanding from it to take responsibility, a political catchword that actually means a stronger military engagement in the world. US President Obama hinted at this request in his speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin last June when he said that we - the USA and Europe - have to “see ourselves as part of something bigger than our own experience” in order to meet global challenges like terrorism, extremism or poverty, and he continues: “Our alliance is the foundation of global security.”

In order to understand Germany’s reluctance when it comes to military interventions, one must know that unlike other countries where the president or government sends out troops, in Germany every military action needs the approval of the parliament. There is also the fact that these military actions are extremely unpopular among Germans, a legacy of its belligerent past. These two taken together explain why Germany usually prefers to pursue its checkbook-diplomacy.

The new coalition of conservatives and center-left Social Democrats holds around 80 percent of the seats in parliament, which opens entirely new possibilities for policymakers. A German government that has the power to outvote the opposition of socialists and the Green Party, both traditionally averse to military interventions, could effectively initiate a bolder foreign policy with an increased military engagement. Of course it has to be mentioned that a superiority of that sort has its downside as well.

The idea that Germany might send more soldiers into more countries provokes unrest among many people in the media, including the SPIEGEL magazine columnist Jakob Augstein (article in German). He argues that the Afghanistan mission, Germany’s largest military intervention since WWII, was a huge waste of lives, materiel and money and, moreover, completely futile since the country will be the same soon after the last German troops leave by the end of this year. Unfortunately, he might be right. But this does not allow to conclude that all military missions are equally useless. The Kosovo intervention, even though legally questionable, stopped an ongoing genocide, while France’s engagement in Mali caused militant jihadists to retreat. Furthermore, Augstein states that today’s cultural conflicts cannot be resolved with arms. This might be true, but not all of today’s conflicts are cultural. Many revolve around money, power or natural resources.

German soldiers in Mali. Source: Bundeswehr/Timo Wirtz

One important aspect that often remains unmentioned is that a stronger German engagement does not at all mean the sending of strike forces. It means support and it means peacekeeping. Augstein lists the number of fallen German troops in Afghanistan (54 soldiers and policemen) and asks if their deaths were not enough already? Well, if peacekeeping missions help to prevent civil wars and genocides, then the death of soldiers was not in vain. Soldiers know that they risk their lives for other people. To put it bluntly, death is part of their job. Of course it is painful for the family members and the society as a whole, but unfortunately peace sometimes only comes to a certain price.

In his book War, Guns, and Votes (New York 2009), Paul Collier explains how “expenditure on peacekeeping strongly and significantly reduces the risk that a post-conflict situation will revert to civil war” (p. 83), but he also describes the problem with peacekeeping: “It is expensive and unpopular.” (p. 85) The German society should not be too skeptical when it comes to military interventions. Von der Leyen is not wrong when she says: “Due to globalization, distant conflicts are now much closer to Europe, whether we like it or not.” Look closely at my two quotations of her. She justifies military intervention with ethical responsibility as well as with European security concerns. It is those reasons why Germany should not follow the policy of military restraint any longer but cooperate with its international partners in supporting struggling countries. The talk is done, now Germany must back its words with actions.